🪖 Cuban Regime Military Intelligence Unified country-MIL intel platform — inventory · operations · bases · fleet · personnel
🚨
[CRITICAL] TODAY'S HEADLINE · 2023-06-01
Iranian and Russian drone deliveries to Cuba 2023-2026
Per the 2026-05-17 US intelligence disclosure, Cuba has received over 300 attack drones from Russia and Iran since 2023, transported via Russian state air bridge (Aviacon Zitotrans Il-76, RA-78765 among others) and Mahan Air–linked routes. Storage suspected at San Antonio de los Baños airbase and at FAR depots near Mariel.
↗ Source
🪖 Active personnel
149
MIL + HR violators + intel
⚙ Inventory items
49
1 crit · 10 high
🎯 CRIT/HIGH active ops
3
4 active total
🏛 Strategic mil sites
32
air · naval · SIGINT · detention
🌐 Foreign mil presence
15
3 flags · 6 ⚓ · 9 ✈
⚔ Combat-deployed troops
~5,000
sum of COMBAT_ENGAGEMENT ops
🚨 Open MIL patterns
0
CRITICAL + HIGH
🔮 PREDICTIVE FORECAST · Latest 30/60/90-day estimates · low/mid/high bands see full forecast →
Drones 350 [298–438] → HIGH
Air defense 100 [85–125] → HIGH
Naval 15 [13–19] → HIGH
Personnel 343 [292–429] → LOW
Foreign advisors 1 [1–1] → LOW
SIGINT 7 [6–9] → HIGH
Cyber 106 [90–132] → LOW
Threat probability 38 [32–48] → LOW
🎖 Personnel by rank · 57 tracked → All MIL
General de Ejército
2
General de Cuerpo de Ejército
3
General de Brigada
1
Coronel
11
Mayor
27
Capitán
7
Teniente
6
Note: rank is derived from current_position_en/es text — ingestion to a dedicated persons.military_rank column pending.
⚙ Inventory by category · 49 items → All inventory
Category # Qty Updated
🛩 DRONE 1C 3H
6 350 outdated 5mo
🛡 GROUND_VEHICLE 1H
13 1,440 outdated 5mo
✈ AIRCRAFT 1H
8 99 outdated 5mo
🚀 MISSILE 3H
6 1,180 outdated 5mo
💥 ARTILLERY 1H
5 170 outdated 5mo
⛽ FUEL_RESERVE 1H
1 — outdated 5mo
🔫 FIREARMS_STOCK
5 392,000 outdated 5mo
⚓ NAVAL_ASSET
3 5 outdated 5mo
💣 AMMUNITION
1 — outdated 5mo
🥘 RATIONS_MRE
1 — outdated 5mo
🪖 Force Structure — Estimated Strength · open-source estimates · force-wide, not named individuals
⚠ Estimates carry real uncertainty — internal-security & informant figures are not published by the regime. Bands show low–high; confidence reflects source quality.
Armed + security (mid est.)
~1.3M
FAR + MININT + special + paramilitary
Informant network (CDR)
~8M
members · domestic surveillance
🪖 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Cuba's regular military under MINFAR — active personnel.
Army (Ejército)
Ground forces; conscript-heavy, equipment largely Soviet-era.
35k–40k
conf: MED
Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria)
Small coastal navy; limited blue-water capability.
2.5k–3.5k
conf: MED
Air & Air Defence Force (DAAFAR)
Aging MiG fleet; SAM-based air defence.
6k–8k
conf: MED
Ready Reserves
Trained reservists subject to recall.
~39k
conf: LOW
🛡 Ministry of the Interior (MININT)
Internal security, intelligence and police apparatus — secret police and uniformed police.
State Security (Seguridad del Estado / DSE)
Secret police / counter-intelligence. Headcount opaque; widely-cited estimate ~20k officers, far more part-time collaborators.
15k–30k
conf: LOW
National Revolutionary Police (PNR)
Uniformed national police under MININT.
10k–20k
conf: LOW
Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras)
Coastal/maritime border control; intercepts migrant and smuggling craft.
6k–7k
conf: MED
🐝 Special Forces
Elite units. NOTE: 'Avispas Negras' (Black Wasps) are MININT special-operations troops — distinct from the 'Red Avispa' (Wasp Network) foreign spy ring.
Black Wasps (Avispas Negras — MININT Special Troops)
Elite counter-terror / special-operations unit. Strength not published; analyst estimate.
1k–5k
conf: LOW
FAR Special Operations (Tropas Especiales FAR)
Military special-operations forces under MINFAR.
2k–6k
conf: LOW
⚙ Paramilitary & Mass Mobilization
Militia and labour-army formations available for mobilization.
Youth Labour Army (EJT)
Conscript labour force under MINFAR; agricultural/construction tasking.
60k–70k
conf: MED
Civil Defence Force
Disaster-response / civil-defence organization.
~50k
conf: LOW
Territorial Troops Militia (MTT)
Mass reserve militia; nominal strength ~1M, real readiness far lower.
500k–1M
conf: LOW
👁 Surveillance & Informant Network
Civilian surveillance network — the regime's domestic 'eyes and ears'.
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) — members
Neighbourhood-watch / block-surveillance organization. Membership ~8M covers most adults; not all are active informants, but it is the backbone of domestic monitoring.
6M–8.4M
conf: LOW
Primary sources: IISS — The Military Balance 2024 · CIA World Factbook — Cuba (Military and Security) · GlobalSecurity.org — Cuba Military · updated 2026-05-20
📦 Equipment Acquisition Timeline · 🗓 what they have / how old it is
⚠ Cuba's arsenal is overwhelmingly Soviet-era (1960s–1991). After the USSR dissolved the supply line ended — most platforms are now grounded, stored, cannibalised for parts, or retired. Quantities are open-source estimates.
✈ Air
MiG-21 'Fishbed' fighters
USSR 1960s · Multiple variants delivered through the 1960s–1980s; many dozens at peak.
Status: Largely retired/stored; a handful possibly airworthy.
Backbone of the early DAAFAR; airframes now decades past intended service life.
conf: HIGH
MiG-23 'Flogger' fighters
USSR 1970s · MiG-23 deliveries from the late 1970s into the 1980s (~50+).
Status: Mostly grounded; limited if any operational airframes.
The 1987 'MiG-23 over Florida' incident underscored how forward this fleet once was.
conf: HIGH
MiG-29 'Fulcrum' fighters
USSR 1990 · Roughly a dozen delivered 1989–1990, just before the USSR collapsed.
Status: Cuba's most modern fighters, but few likely airworthy due to parts/funding.
Last major combat-aircraft transfer before the Soviet supply line ended.
conf: HIGH
Mi-8/Mi-17 'Hip' helicopters
USSR 1970s · Transport/utility helicopters delivered through the 1970s–1980s.
Status: Some still in service for transport; airframes aging.
Rotary fleet has more practical residual utility than the fast-jet fleet.
conf: MED
📡 Air Defence
S-75 Dvina (SA-2 'Guideline') SAM
USSR 1960s · First strategic SAM system; central to the 1962 Missile Crisis air-defence picture.
Status: Largely obsolete; many sites inactive.
A U.S. U-2 was downed by an SA-2 over Cuba in October 1962.
conf: HIGH
S-125 Neva (SA-3 'Goa') SAM
USSR 1970s · Low-to-medium-altitude SAM delivered in the 1970s.
Status: Aging; limited operational readiness.
Complemented the SA-2 in the layered Soviet-pattern air-defence net.
conf: MED
2K12 Kub (SA-6 'Gainful') mobile SAM
USSR 1980s · Mobile medium-range SAM delivered in the 1980s.
Status: Aging; readiness uncertain.
More survivable than fixed SA-2/SA-3 sites due to mobility.
conf: MED
🛡 Armour
T-54/T-55 main battle tanks
USSR 1960s · Several hundred delivered from the 1960s; mainstay of the armoured force.
Status: Many in storage; some reportedly dug in as static gun emplacements.
Cuba has reportedly converted some hulls to static coastal-defence gun positions.
conf: HIGH
T-62 main battle tanks
USSR 1970s · Delivered in the 1970s to complement the T-54/55 fleet.
Status: Aging; readiness low, limited spares.
More capable than the T-55 but still a 1960s-design platform.
conf: MED
BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles
USSR 1980s · Tracked IFVs delivered in the 1970s–1980s.
Status: Aging mechanised-infantry mounts; mixed readiness.
Standard Warsaw-Pact-era IFV; no modern replacement acquired.
conf: MED
BTR-60/BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers
USSR 1970s · Wheeled APCs delivered across the 1960s–1980s.
Status: Aging; partial readiness.
Soviet wheeled APC family typical of client-state inventories of the period.
conf: MED
Post-1991 refurbishment & locally upgraded systems
Cuba 2000s · After 1991 Cuba largely refurbished and improvised rather than buying new — e.g. dug-in tanks, locally re-engined vehicles.
Status: Stop-gap measures to keep Soviet-era kit nominally usable.
Reflects the absence of a modern external supplier after the Soviet collapse.
conf: LOW
⚓ Naval
Osa-class missile fast attack craft
USSR 1970s · Styx-armed missile boats delivered through the 1970s–1980s.
Status: Largely retired/non-operational; few if any active.
Once the main anti-ship punch of the Cuban navy.
conf: MED
Komar-class missile boats
USSR 1960s · Early Styx missile boats delivered in the 1960s.
Status: Long retired.
Predecessor to the larger Osa-class FACs.
conf: MED
Koni-class frigate
USSR 1980s · Single Koni-class frigate (the largest combatant Cuba operated).
Status: Retired/decommissioned.
Cuba never sustained a true blue-water surface combatant capability after retirement.
conf: MED
Foxtrot-class diesel-electric submarines
USSR 1980s · Up to three Foxtrot-class submarines transferred in the 1980s.
Status: Long retired; Cuba has no operational submarine force.
Operated only briefly; never a sustained sub-surface capability.
conf: MED
🚀 Missile
FROG-7 (Luna-M) artillery rockets
USSR 1980s · Short-range unguided battlefield rockets delivered in the 1980s.
Status: Aging; operational status unclear.
Battlefield rocket system, not a strategic missile.
conf: LOW
P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 'Styx') anti-ship missiles
USSR 1960s · Anti-ship missiles arming the Komar/Osa missile boats.
Status: Effectively obsolete with the retirement of their launch platforms.
Some reportedly adapted to coastal-defence launchers.
conf: MED
🎯 Infantry
Russian/Venezuelan/Chinese small-arms & parts (limited)
Russia / Venezuela / China 2000s · Limited, poorly documented post-2000 transfers of small arms, spares and light equipment.
Status: Trickle imports; no major platform recapitalisation.
Scale and details are uncertain; treat as low-confidence indicators of continued supplier ties.
conf: LOW
Primary sources: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database · IISS — The Military Balance · GlobalSecurity.org — Cuba Military · updated 2026-05-20
🛰 Intel Coverage — How Far Back We Can See · 📅 per-source historical floor & blind spots
Earliest = practical floor of usable data on the open/free tier (not necessarily the source's founding date). Live = real-time / near-real-time feed. Documenting our own blind spots is part of the analysis.
Source Earliest Live? What it can / cannot see
⚓ Maritime
MarineTraffic / AIS (vessel tracking) 2004 ● live AIS adoption ~2004; free tier shows current positions with no deep archive. Blind to AIS-dark vessels and spoofed identities — exactly the dark-fleet behaviour we hunt.
✈ Air
FlightRadar24 / ADS-B Exchange / OpenSky (aircraft tracking) 2016 ● live Crowd-sourced ADS-B coverage practically usable from ~2016; ADS-B Exchange shows un-filtered military/state traffic. Blind where transponders are switched off.
📰 News/Legal
GDELT (global news events) 1979 ● live GDELT 1.0 indexes world news events back to 1979; near-real-time updates. Strong for event/tone trends, weak for primary-document verification.
CourtListener (US court records) 1999 ● live Coverage thins before ~1999 and is sparse before ~1990; PACER-linked dockets and opinions. Good for indictments/litigation, blind to sealed matters.
⚖ Sanctions
OFAC SDN list (sanctions designations) n/a ● live Dated per entry; deep historical designations reachable via the SDN list and archives. Sees designated parties only — not undisclosed front companies until added.
✊ Human Rights
Prisoners Defenders (human-rights / political prisoners) 2019 ● live Monthly political-prisoner lists from ~2019 onward. Pre-2019 repression requires Cuba Archive (documented cases since 1959).
🗄 Leaks
ICIJ Offshore Leaks (Panama/Paradise/Pandora Papers) n/a ○ static Static leak datasets covering offshore structures across many decades; not a live feed. Loaded locally from ICIJ's ODbL bulk dataset (icij_offshore.db) into a review-only table — nothing auto-promotes. Sees only entities present in the leaked records; presence is not evidence of wrongdoing.
💬 Social
Reddit 2005 ● live Public posts/comments from 2005; useful for diaspora chatter and early eyewitness reports. Noisy, requires corroboration.
Telegram 2013 ● live Public channels from 2013; key for on-the-ground Cuban reporting and protest coordination. Private channels are not visible.
Truth Social 2022 ● live Launched 2022; relevant for US official/political statements. Narrow scope.
X / Twitter 2006 ○ static NO automated coverage since 2026-05-21. The Nitter mirrors this platform relied on all went dead (NXDOMAIN) and X has no free API; the scan_nitter feed was retired 2026-09-23. X can still be read by an operator through a Mode-A browser sweep, but there is no live automated feed. Treat X as an uncovered blind spot.
updated 2026-09-23
🔥 Top-5 most-threatening assets
# Designation Category Threat Qty Updated
1
Cuba attack-drone stockpile (aggregate)
Cuban regime attack-drone stockpile (300+, aggregate)
DRONE CRITICAL 🇺🇸 300–500 outdated 5mo ↗
2
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
9K32 Strela-2 / SA-7 Grail MANPADS (legacy)
MISSILE HIGH 🇺🇸 300–1000 outdated 5mo ↗
3
9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
9K34 Strela-3 / SA-14 Gremlin MANPADS
MISSILE HIGH 🇺🇸 200–600 outdated 5mo ↗
4
MiG-29
MiG-29 Fulcrum (Cuban Revolutionary Air Force)
AIRCRAFT HIGH 🇺🇸 2–6 outdated 5mo ↗
5
Mohajer-6
Iranian Mohajer-6 MALE drone (UNCONFIRMED in Cuban service)
DRONE HIGH 🇺🇸 outdated 5mo ↗
📡 Recent military activity · last 14d · ops · alerts · naval · air · sanctions 12 rows
⚡ 2026-10-17 DESIGNATION DESIGNATION · Lists Sanctions List Service Specially Designated Nationals ↗ ⚡ 2026-10-15 DESIGNATION DESIGNATION · Sanctioning Cuban State-Owned Banco Internacional de Comercio, S.A. (BICSA) - United States Department of State ↗ ⚡ 2026-10-14 POLICY_CHANGE POLICY_CHANGE · Reddit signal — sanctions / OFAC / policy: Thesis on Cuba and healthcare; Sanctions impact ↗ ⚡ 2026-10-12 POLICY_CHANGE POLICY_CHANGE · Cuban state press (granma.cu) ↗ ⚡ 2026-10-09 POLICY_CHANGE POLICY_CHANGE · Cuban state press (granma.cu) ↗ ⚡ 2026-10-08 POLICY_CHANGE POLICY_CHANGE · Cuban state press (granma.cu) ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 MEDIUM Cuban support to ELN (Colombia) and Havana-hosted talks ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 HIGH CIA Director Ratcliffe Havana warning visit ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 CRITICAL Iranian and Russian drone deliveries to Cuba 2023-2026 ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 HIGH Cuban DGI advisors and security mission in Venezuela (Maduro regime) ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 HIGH Cuban troops in combat against Ukraine on Russia's side ↗ 🎯 2026-05-17 CRITICAL Cuba 300+ attack-drone acquisition + US-directed threat planning ↗
🌐 Foreign military presence · 6 ⚓ · 9 ✈ non-Cuba flags
⚓ Vessels
ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH Russia FRIGATE —
CNS SILK ROAD ARK China LOGISTICS —
RFS SOOBRAZITELNY Russia FRIGATE —
USAV WILSON WHARF United States LOGISTICS —
USNS LARAMIE (T-AO-203) United States LOGISTICS —
USS WICHITA (LCS-13) United States PATROL —
✈ Aircraft
169806 United States UAV outdated 5mo
F5N-USN-CUBA-FLYBY United States FIGHTER outdated 6mo
RA-26226 Russia PATROL outdated 6mo
99-0006 United States TRANSPORT outdated 6mo
MQ4C-USN-CUBA-ISR United States UAV outdated 6mo
RC135V-USAF-CUBA-ISR United States INTEL outdated 6mo
P8A-USN-CUBA-ISR United States PATROL outdated 6mo
B-2818 China INTEL outdated 6mo
E2D-USN-CUBA-AEW United States INTEL outdated 6mo
🗺 Strategic military sites · 32 sites → Full map
SIGINT Spy base Naval Air base MIL station / detention
Explore sub-sections
⚙
INVENTORY
Hardware catalog · tanks, planes, drones, missiles
🎯
OPERATIONS
Past + current FAR ops, advisor missions, espionage
🏛
BASES
Strategic sites map — naval, airbases, SIGINT
⚓
MGR FLEET
Patrol-boat hulls, live AIS
👤
PERSONNEL
Regime military officers, HR violators